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To the Reader:

This is an article draft I am working on, spun off from a larger research project involving geography, religion, and their connections in the work of William De Brahm, Surveyor General of the Southern District of North America between 1763 and 1775. This material, drawn from research into the settlement and mapping of British East Florida in the 1760s and 1770s, deals with British imperial policy in the years 1762, as Britain was winding up the Seven Years' War and began planning for their new territories of Canada and East and West Florida in the Americas.

It is still quite raw but I am at something of a crossroads with this project, with numerous places where I could explore these ideas further. But since this is my first foray into this sort of policy history, I am hoping to benefit from the input of the MRSEAH and to see if there is enough in this topic to merit further exploration and what the most fruitful direction(s) might be. In particular, I'm not totally sold on the bit about Florida at the end but am not yet ready to jettison it.

So, have at it. I look forward to your feedback and comments. Anything you can offer will be most helpful and appreciated.

Robert

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"Florida, the Proclamation of 1763, and the Idea of a Beautiful America"

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The Proclamation of 1763 was, by almost any measure, an absurd idea. is a familiar enough act for any student of American history. Transforming a poorly mapped mountain region into a seemingly authoritative boundary with only the "scratch of a pen" (to reference a recent title) was an astounding act of hubris and seemed so at the time, with at least one peer of the realm calling it a "very silly" document.[1] That it is not often thought of in such terms is perhaps owing to how familiar it is to the modern eye. In particular, the Proclamation's well-known boundary line curls along the spine of the Appalachians in textbook and schoolroom maps, marking the western boundary of the original thirteen colonies for every schoolchild and college student alike. (Even though those thirteen colonies recognized no such western border and in several instances fought a Revolution against that imposition). Thanks to its association with an obvious geographic divide in North America, its existence even seems "natural" to us. This naturalization of a political decision has perhaps led to a general lack of questioning about the origins and purposes of the Proclamation beyond the most cursory.

Given the enormous consequences of the Proclamation on North American history—for Anglo-Indian relations, British colonial policy, and the colonies' break with the king to name just a few—it is perhaps worth investigating its origins a little more closely. The Proclamation was not simply an unthinking policy of convenience, but a much more significant departure from British policy that required rethinking the ideas of empire and nation. More than just a general idea of increased metropolitan control, the Proclamation reveals a new vision of the ideal state emerging

[1] Lord Northington, quoted in R.A. Humphrey, "Lord Shelburne and the Proclamation of 1763," *The English Historical Review* 49, 194 (April 1934): 241-261, at 241. The "scratch of a pen" reference is to Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

within the mainstream of British eighteenth-century politics, one that sheds some light not only on the origins of the growing conflict with the colonies, but on Britain's transition from so-called First to Second Empires in the 1760s.

What little attention historians have paid to the policies of 1762-1763 has tended to paint British decision-makers as reactive individuals responding to events they did not or could not control.[2] It is best to think of the series of American policy innovations between 1762 and 1764 not as disconnected whims of personality and circumstance but as a somewhat coherent vision for the future of America. It was not perfectly consistent , but, as we are learning in recent years, ideas of nation and empire were neither altogether coherent nor consistent in general.[3] And, one should not mistake inconsistency for lack of commitment. The architects of policy between 1762 and 1764 seem to have been deeply committed to a vague idea that simply looked good on paper.

Taken together, the acquisition of Florida and Canada during Anglo-French peace negotiations in 1762, the Proclamation of 1763, and the Plan of 1764 reforming the Indian trade can be seen as a set of policies responding to a certain vision of nation and empire that emerged

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[2] In his account of the Seven Years War, Fred Anderson located the origins of the Peace of 1763 in the brilliance of the French diplomats who disentangled the Bute administration from the sticky position of the war's last years. See Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, Reprint edition. (New York: Vintage, 2001), 504-505. Those who have studies the effects of the Proclamation of 1763 have paid little attention to its origins. Woody Holton, whose *Forced Founders* did so much to reframe the events of the 1760s as a response to the Proclamation, nonetheless paid only a couple footnotes' worth of attention to the origins of the Proclamation, mostly basing his understanding of the origins in Charles Ritcheson's thesis. Colin Calloway, whose *With the Stroke of a Pen* provided a close examination of the Proclamation's effects, likewise paid almost no attention to the policy's origins. See Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press for Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1999), 28fn. and Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). And those few who have studied British motives in this period have tended to follow Charles Ritcheson's characterization of the Proclamation as a part of George Grenville's penny pinching bolstered by the attacks of Pontiac and others in the Ohio Valley. Charles R. Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution,* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 9-14; Keith Perry does do more than Ritcheson to locate the policy in the Bute administration, but still largely follows Ritcheson's attribution of the policy to Grenville. See Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, British History in Perspective, ed. Jeremy Black, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 31.

[3] See for example, Linda Colley's examination of British nationalism as a set of common symbols rather than a consistent political ideal in her *Britons : Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (*New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) and also Anthony Pagden's note that eighteenth-century British imperialists could never quite figure out how to define their empire in his "Fellow Citizens and Imperial Subjects: Conquest and Sovereignty in Europe's Overseas Empires." *History and Theory* 44, no. 4 (2005): 28–46.

primarily among pro-Union Scots and Irish imperial agents in the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Central to this new idea of nation were a break from the older ethnic identifications of kingdom and country and a new attachment to systems of government defined by clear limits. This new vision of nation abhorred broken lines of authority and disruptive enclaves and instead celebrated peace and prosperity through humans striving together under orderly systems suitable to a society's stage of development. It was a vision that celebrated a particular "continental" aesthetic—ideal societies grew out of natural bounds marking harmonious systems working in union to produce the best possible government.[4] Looking at the policies of the Bute and early Grenville administrations—the Treaty of Paris negotiations of 1762-3, the Proclamation of 1763, and the Plan of 1764 reforming the Indian trade—one can see this new continentalist perspective informing all the policy steps taken in those years. These plans were based in ideas and visions of empire created in eighteenth-century Britain that could be exported to and imposed upon America.

These new ideas of empire entered British policy-making due to the political shifts of George III's early reign, in particular the rearrangement of the cabinet under John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute. Like any new administration, Bute put his favorites into certain places of power and influence without radically remaking the makeup of the cabinet.[5] Historians of the Proclamation have tended, when looking for origins of the policy, have tended to attribute its adoption to these new Bute loyalists in the cabinet, in particular some combination of Lord Shelburne, the new President of the Board of Trade, the Earl of Halifax (the new Northern Secretary of State), or the Earl of Egremont (the continuing Southern Secretary of State).[6] It was not so much that these men were radical

[4] Thanks to Paul Mapp for suggesting "continental" as a term to describe this new aesthetic. I am still working out, however, exactly what he meant by that.

[5] Peter D.G. Thomas, *George III: King and Politicians, 1760-1770*. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2002, 68.

[6] Historians have variously attributed the Proclamation's authorship to Lord Shelburne, President of the Board of Trade when the Proclamation was drafted, George Egremont, who was Southern Secretary of State at the time of adoption, or George Grenville, Prime Minister when the policy was enacted. For the players in this debate. The case for Egremont has been made by Verner Crane in his introduction to [Henry Ellis], "Hints Relative to the Division and Government of

political reformers in their own right. In the age of faction, with members and peers alike pursuing patronage and power, it would take a great deal of effort to discern a party ideology or even a like-minded set of factional policies in the swirl of administration comings and goings.[7]

But the small shifts in the Bute administration did place a growing body of imperial advisors from the fringes of Britain closer to the centers of decision-making. The policies of 1762-4 seem mostly to have originated from a growing class of colonial governors, military officers, and other non-elected writers and thinkers, many of them of Irish and Scottish origins who began redirecting imperial ideas along the lines of the so-called "Scottish Enlightenment."[8] It would be inaccurate to label this a strictly Scottish movement, even though the ideas of philosophies of Scottish thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith were important to these new advisors. But they included Irish-born figures such as Arthur Hobbs, governor of North Carolina; Henry Ellis, governor of Georgia; and William Knox, Ellis's provost marshal in Georgia. Scottish-born figures such as Robert Dinwiddie, lieutenant-governor of Virginia; John Stuart, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern District; James Murray, governor of Quebec; and James Grant, governor of East Florida, also composed part of this body of writers and policy-makers. Historians have noted the increasing prevalence of these Irish- and Scottish-born advisors.

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the Conquered and Newly Acquired Countries in America," ed. Verner W. Crane, *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 8 (March 1922): 367-373 and Jack M Sosin in his *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961, 55-57; R.A. Humphreys advocated for Shelburne in his "Lord Shelburne and the Proclamation of 1763." *The English Historical Review* 49, no. 194 (April 1, 1934): 241–64; Charles R. Ritcheson argued that the policy was of a piece with Grenville's policy agenda in his *British Politics and the American Revolution,* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 9-12, a statement supported by Keith Perry in his *British Politics and the American Revolution*, British History in Perspective, ed. Jeremy Black, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, 31. Woody Holton, in his work on the effects of the Proclamation in Virginia echoed Ritcheson's argument in his Holton, Woody, and Omohundro Institute of Early American History & Culture. *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia*, 1999. p. ###

[7] On the factionalism and political alignments of George III"s early reign, see Thomas, *George III*, 12-16.

[8] See Ned C. Landsman, "The Provinces and the Empire: Scotland, the American Colonies and the Development of British Provincial Identity," in Stone, Lawrence. *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815*. London ; New York: Routledge, 1994: 258-287, at 266-7, also Snapp, J. Russell. "An Enlightened Empire: Scottish and Irish Imperial Reformers in the Age of the American Revolution." *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 33, no. 3 (2001): 388–403. Ritcheson, *British Politics*, 9; Gold, Robert L. *Borderland Empires in Transition : The Triple-Nation Transfer of Florida* /. Carbondale : Southern Illinois University Press, c1969, 122-126

The origins and worldview of these men were not altogether coincidental. Bute himself was influenced by Scottish philosophy and trained George III to appreciate the English government as a system.[9] When placed into administration, Bute drew into the top levels of decision making people who had once belonged to his intellectual and social circle centered on the late Prince Frederick and the royal residence at Leicester House in London. Bute's favorites—men like Halifax and Shelburne—worked their way into government over the later years of George II's reign and their clients—men like Ellis and Stuart—were appointed to administrative posts in the colonies. When Bute's new cabinet began shaping policy at the end of the Seven Years' War, their colonial correspondents had become trusted advisors, and the philosophies that shaped them all likewise shaped the new regime's priorities and proclamations. Ellis in particular became an influential figure, helping to advise Halifax and Egremont alike and he has been credited as at least a partial author of the Proclamation of 1763 itself.[10]

Central to the continentalist aesthetic advocated by this new corps of advisors was a new emphasis on "natural" boundaries. The idea of "natural" boundaries—those defined by prominent and seemingly immutable geological features such as rivers and mountains—had been well established before the eighteenth century. Western Europeans had generally come to believe that whole territories were more peaceful and more prosperous than divided ones and the Enlightenment emphasis on nature preferred unchanging geography to temperamental human arrangements as the best bounds for national government. Kingdoms like France that had spent centuries negotiating and fighting over sovereignty on their periphery turned to a project of eliminating foreign enclaves within their bounds and seeking out "natural" boundaries that could define their territory in

[9] Thomas, *George III,* 3.

[10] Despite all the dispute over which cabinet member to credit (or blame) for the Proclamation, many of the above authors give Ellis point of pride for being a key intellectual force behind it. Crane, intro. To Ellis, "Hints," 368fn; Humphreys, "Shelburne," 247-8; Edward Cashin, Ellis's biographer, provides the most exhaustive case for Ellis's authorship of numerous key policies in the late 1750s and early 1760s in his *Governor Henry Ellis and the Transformation of British North America.* Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994, 167-192.

perpetuity.[11] England likewise had adopted this line of thinking by the 1700s, following through on Henry VIII's vision for an ancient and unified ethnic island kingdom in the mold of the legendary king Brutus.[12] But, as with France, England by the 1700s had transformed conquest politics into abstract ideal, and Britain, with coasts that could never be changed by human whim, seemed a natural candidate for the ideal state, at once small enough to unify is small kingdoms and large enough to provide resources for a prosperous and commercial nation, safe and secure from the constant wars that plagued Europe.[13]

As historians Linda Colley and David Armitage have noted, Britain's island boundaries had become a widespread symbol in national ideology by the eighteenth century, marking Britain as the perfect nation. This ideal island nation, of course, contained multitudes and a key part of British national imagery was a contradictory idealization of its own divided and fractious "liberty." The British Empire was anything but a coherent political entity, after all. In this context Britain's boundaries were more a symbol than a meaningful ideological bond. They existed alongside other supposedly "British" traits of shared Protestantism, commercialism, and political "liberty" as common totems that smoothed the fractious nature of British politics, especially in the decades following the integration of Scotland into English government after the Act of Union in 1707. In this new era, national bounds and ideological touchstones provided a framework in which Britons could fight their political battles without completely sundering the nation apart. Weak as they were, their vagueness was their strength. So long as Britons could invoke their status as "Protestant,

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[11] Norman J. G. Pounds, "France and 'Les Limites Naturelles' from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries," *Annals of the American Association of Geographers* 44 (March 1954): 51-62, at 51-53; Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 93-102; Sahlins, "Natural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century" *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 95, (Dec., 1990): 1423-1451, at 1435-1438; Michael Biggs, "Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41 (April 1, 1999): 374–405, at 387-388.

[12] Armitage, David. *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2000), 36-9.

[13] For the full history of Britain's island nation ideals beginning with Henry VIII, it is woven through David Armitage's, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For Britain's idealization of its boundaries, see Linda Colley, *Britons : Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 17-18 and

commercial, and free" they could claim authentic Britishness (and ward off the constant fear of seeming too French).[14]

But the continentalist aesthetic celebrated more than just a common set of symbols. Unlike the idea of an ancient, ethnic, "natural" nation, these thinkers had begun to see natural boundaries as just the first step toward the creation of a national identiyy. Eschewing the ethnic nationalism of, say French expansionists and their ideas of restoring ancient Gaul or Henry VIII's attempts to re-unify ancient Britain under his authority, these thinkers saw natural boundaries as simply a pragmatic means of defining the limits of government systems. This was the Britain of the Scottish Enlightenment—a nation unified not just by its geography but by the hard human labor of governing a bounded territory.

David Hume in particular seems to be a key influence for this new aesthetic, given his close social connections to many of the figures in the Bute administration. Hume was well known to the Leicester House circles that included Bute, Halifax, and Grenville. His London agent, James Oswald was an associate of the group and promoted the first edition of Hume's "Essays Moral and Political" there in 1742.[15] And Hume became acquainted with Bute and Grenville directly in the years after publication of his History of Great Britain.[16] Ellis, who had been part of that circle since 1747, would undoubtedly have been exposed to Hume's work through his associates there (not to mention the fact that Hume's essays were popular in their time and would likely have been known to any educated Londoner by the 1750s. James Grant's connections to Hume were even more direct, as

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Brückner, Martin. *The Geographic Revolution in Early America: Maps, Literacy, and National Identity*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2006), 88-89.

[14] Linda Colley, *Britons : Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 17-18; also David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 11. This idea of a united Britain was itself contested. Increasingly, those who celebrated British national strength emerged from the northern reaches and took on a decidedly Scottish character. As Linda Colley has shown, their emergence as intellectual and political leaders within Britain were increasingly met by an English, ethnocentric backlash that disputed whether this harmonious Union had actually been a good thing The career of John Wilkes, in particular, rose on this wave of anti-Scottish sentiment emerging in Britain in the middle decades of the 1700s. Colley, *Britons*, 113-117.

they were traveling companions to Vienna and Turin as part of James St. Clair's embassy to Austria and Italy in 1747.[17]

Hume provided some of the earliest and clearest articulation of this emerging idea of the best possible nation in his 1741-2 Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. In particular his essay "Of National Characters" defined Britain by its absence of a unifying national character, replacing it with a common system of governance (the fabled mixed English system of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy). Hume's meditation on nation and boundary emphasized boundaries' abilities to define the edges of political systems. But it was common system and human interaction, rather than mysteries of nature, that Hume felt defined national characters. "Where a number of men are united into one political body," he argued, "the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character." Stripping away the gluey web of antiquity and Anglo-centric overtones that defined, say, the older Country Whig idea of government, Hume said it was simply the system not the concretion of ancient Anglo-Saxon precedents, that defined Britain. The "great liberty and independency, which every man enjoys, allows him to display the manners peculiar to him. Hence, the ENGLISH, or any people in the universe, have the least of a national character; unless this very singularity may pass for such."[18] The loose but significant bonds of the mixed English constitution and its obvious territorial and jurisdictional limits were the system's greatest strength. Hume's emphasis on systems within bounds

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[15] Mossner, Ernest Campbell. *The Life of David Hume*. 2nd ed. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford UniversityPress, 1980, 145-146.
[16] Greig, J. Y. T. *David Hume*. Philosophy of David Hume. New York: Garland Pub, 1983, 247
[17] Nelson, Paul David. *General James Grant : Scottish Soldier and Royal Governor of East Florida* /. Gainesville : University Press of Florida, c1993, 12; Grieg, 147-148
[18] Hume, David. *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*. Eugene F. Miller, ed. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc. 1987. Library of Economics and Liberty [Online] available from http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL21.html; accessed 29 May 2016; Internet; On the organic idea of "constitution" in the Country Whig ideologies of the earlier eighteenth century, see Bailyn, Bernard. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), p.

made him one of the earliest theorists of a new imperial vision for Britain, one that was capable of projecting its ideas across the Atlantic and including the colonial parts of "Britain" not contained within its lovely island bounds.[19]

Hume's vision helped define this new vision of nation emerging in the middle decades of the 1700s. While not a perfectly unified ideology of empire, it did have several distinct features that help us understand the policies of 1762-1764. First and foremost it was pro-Union, seeing in the act of 1707 a great triumph of policy. The joining of Scotland with England and Wales into one unified nation, encircled with natural borders served as the central defining feature of this idea. But it was also an idea of nation that took geography as the stage upon which humans enacted their political, economic, and demographic histories; it was not based in geographic determinism.[20] Like Hume, this vision emphasized systems of human interaction rather than ancient links between land and character. Humans moved across this landscape; they did not grow out of it. This philosophy had obvious appeal to Scots and Irishmen attempting to integrate themselves into an ethnocentric Anglican politics.[21] It is a small wonder, then, that this idea of empire grew out of a hindsight that saw in Scotland's economic growth after the 1750s proof that Union had been a grand idea and that Scots needed only political and economic integration, not a fundamental change in character, to succeed in unified Britain. Linked to this vision of prosperity was a celebration of colonization and the Americas in particular, where Scottish involvement had led to increased wealth for the region vis a vis England.[22]

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[19] Armitage, *Ideological Origins*, 180-182.

[20] On increasing importance of demographics to the Scottish Enlightenment view of nation and economy, see Ned C. Landsman, "The Provinces and the Empire: Scotland, the American Colonies and the Development of British Provincial Identity," in Lawrence Stone, ed., *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (New York: Routledge, 1994): 258-287, at 265.

[21] Snäpp, "Enlightened Empire," 389.

[22] On memorialization of the Act of Union and the legacies of that memory, see Alexander Murdoch, "The Legacy of Unionism in Eighteenth-Century Scotland," in T.M. Devine, ed., *Scotland and the Union, 1707-2007* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008): 77-90, at 84-85; T.M. Devine, "The Spoils of Empire," in Devine, ed. *Scotland and the Union*: 91-108, at 94-95; Landsman, "Provinces," 261-267.

The symbiosis between Celtic ascendance and American expansion reached perhaps its apogee in the Seven Years War. Scottish soldiers and officers were an outsized presence in the British military campaigns in America, so much so that Scots eventually began boasting that they had won America on behalf of England.[23] Scottish investors hungrily published maps and charts of the soon-to-be-conquered prizes of Montreal, Quebec, and Louisbourg.[24] Likewise, Irish-born officials like Ellis and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Norther District William Johnson, indicate that this rise through the ranks of colonial administration was also open to Celts from the western side of the Irish sea. This new class of administrators and advisors' integration into the centers of British politics became complete upon the accession of George III to the throne Bute to the office of Prime Minister in the last years of the war.

While few have credited the short-lived and little-loved Bute government with political brilliance or extraordinary vision, it did nonetheless oversee a dramatic reshaping of British policy toward America.[25] As the "imperial Scots" used the Seven Years War to reform and remake the Atlantic Empire, the years between 1762 and 1764 saw a particular vision of America emerge in a series of three political decisions: the peace negotiations of 1762, the Proclamation of 1763, and the so-called Plan of 1764 governing reform of the Indian trade. During this stretch, the architects of British policy in America attempted to recreate a particularly Scottish vision of a harmonious yet divided empire of natural borders that would, after some time of pain and transition, govern itself with little need for outside interference from Britain (aside, of course, from those necessary initiatives that would prevent true independence from developing).

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[23] Landsman, "Provinces," 267. Landsman's article, written specifically about Scots in honor of the tricentennial of Union can be forgiven for its focus on that country. But, given the role of people like Ellis and Knox in this same process, it would be fairer to say that the Irish were also part of this phenomenon.
[24] Devine, "Spoils," 95.
[25] A notable exception is Peter Thomas who does rescue Bute from the worst smears of Whig memorialists. Thomas, *George III*, 67-73.

This attachment to a certain aesthetics of empire explained in part why Britain was willing to trade so much for Florida. While other historians have credited the French negotiators with the proposal to trade Florida and Canada for Cuba and the French Caribbean isles, George III himself was the figure to introduce the acquisition of Florida into the negotiations.[26] That the king himself suggested Florida as a suitable swap for Cuba indicates how closely his vision and Bute's matched the new continentalist aesthetic. The preliminary terms of peace, circulated in Parliament and the press in the fall of 1762, raised objections from those who had first promoted the war. In particular, critics of the treaty seized on the fact that Florida was the only real cession made by France or Spain. Britain, after all, occupied Canada, Cuba, and much of the French West Indies. In exchange for voluntarily abandoning most of its conquests, Britain was to receive only Florida (and to retain its possession of Canada). This seemed a bad deal to Bute's opponents and was characterized as such on the floor of Parliament. William Pitt, the architect of Britain's victories but a bystander to the peace negotiations, made a grand show of criticizing the peace for three hours in his speech, highlighting the absurdity of trading valuable, cultivated colonies for thinly populated and probably useless Florida. Enticing his colleagues with memories of Spanish jewels, Pitt lamented that "all the Spanish treasures and riches in America, lay at our mercy," and yet all of this was traded away "with the cession of Florida only." "The terms were inadequate," he concluded, "They were inadequate in every point, where the principle of reciprocity was affected to be introduced."[27]

Unable to argue against Florida's seeming underdevelopment, defenders of the treaty instead invoked the continentalist vision and shot back that Pitt had an outdated method of evaluating national grandeur. The new aesthetic was evident in their defense of Canada as a valuable acquisition. First, they defended the importance of a naturally bounded empire free of enclaves.

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[26] Thomas, *George III*, 69-73. Fred Anderson, writing one of the classic accounts of the peace negotiations, attributed this innovation almost entirely to French ingenuity in his *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, Reprint edition. (New York: Vintage, 2001), 504-505.

"Experience has shewn us," they argued, "that while France possesses any single place in America, from whence she may molest our settlements, they can never enjoy any repose…. To remove France from our neighbourhood in America… is therefore the most capital advantage we can obtain, and is worth purchasing by almost any concessions."[28] Then, turning the tables on Pitt's arguments, they argued that emphasizing present value was small-minded and short-sighted. The value of a country was not to be "solely tried on its commercial advantages; the extent of territory and a number of subjects are of as much consideration to a state attentive to the sources of real grandeur, as the mere advantages of traffic." Pitt and his scales of equivalence were aiming only at a "limited and petty commonwealth, like Holland," while supporters of the treaty were building "a great, powerful, and warlike nation."[29] Britain was apparently no longer interested in acquiring actually productive regions; it was much better to acquire long, unbroken coastlines that filled up large parts of the map.

This new American empire should be valued for the great wealth that was to come., they argued. British North America now contained a "great variety of climates" and enticed their audience with hints of "the vast resources which would thence arise to commerce."[30] And with France and Spain removed from the borders of these resource-rich territories, "our American planters would, by the very course of their natural propagation in a very short time, furnish out the demand of our manufactures as large as all the working hands of Great Britain could possibly supply."[31] Here was the aesthetic at work—ideal societies grew from ideal boundaries. War and diplomacy served to establish natural boundaries in which people could flourish, grown naturally from the combinations of resources and climates furnished by nature. And, with the troublesome and "unnatural" boundaries between French, Spanish, and British colonies removed, there would be

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[27] Cobbet's Parliamentary History, 15: 1264.
[28] Cobbet's Parliamentary History, 15: 1271
[29] Cobbet's Parliamentary History 15: 1272

less need for costly wars and massive armies in the Americas. In this optimist's view of the future, America would both produce more and cost less. The speeches themselves were not altogether necessary; Bute's administration already had the votes to secure passage before Pitt spoke one word. However, the language of natural and therefore better boundaries would become a defining feature of public discourse over the new territories.

After the treaty's acceptance in February 1763, Britain's geographic writers agreed that, if nothing else, Florida at last provided a natural terminus for Britain's mainland possessions. Florida obviously did not appear in most pre-1763 British accounts of the colonies, for the obvious reason that it was a Spanish colony.[32] After the war, however, it became a useful endpoint for imagining the British mainland colonies. As Alexander Cluny wrote in his The American Traveller, after a colony-by-colony tour of North America from Hudson's Bay to the south, "We are at length arrived at Florida, the Boundary of the British Empire, and consequently the End of our Travels on the Continent of America."[33] Americans protesting British policy in the 1760s began artculating a continental identity by regularly invoking Florida as the southern boundary of a newly defined North America.[34] Even John Mitchell, one of the harshest critics of Britain's settlement of Florida, still treated the peninsula as a natural part of the continent and followed the same north-south progression as other thinkers. In his Present State of Great Britain, Mitchell describe the climates and products of all the colonies, moving from the northern to the south before finally ending at the Floridas.[35]

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[30] Cobbet's, 15: 1272.
[31] Cobbet's 15: 1272
[32] Charles L. Mowat, "The First Campaign of Publicity for Florida." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 30, no. 3 (December 1, 1943): 359–76, at 364-365.
[33] Clúny, Alexander, and Jonas Hanway. *The American Traveller, Or, Observations on the Present State, Culture and Commerce of the British Colonies in America…* [London: Printed for E. and C. Dilly, 1769], 105.
[34] See quotes by [???]Mayhew and [???] Williams in Bruckner, *Revolutions*, 90-91.
[35] Mitchell, *Present State*, 166-185.

The anonymous author of American Husbandry summarized the new aesthetics of empire perhaps better than any. In 1775 they wrote, "there is a roundness now in our continental dominions which will save our posterity, if not ourselves, no slight expences."[36] "Roundness" and natural boundaries would ensure years of peace and prosperity without any required effort to maintain and defend those boundaries. The author recognized that there was little profit in farming swampy and sandy Florida, but he echoed the original Parliamentary defenders of the Treaty of Paris when he declared that, "Florida was an acquisition worth making, upon the principles of removing a dangerous neighbour."[37] He went even further and linked peace and prosperity to the shape of the continent. "[T]he possession of these provinces renders our dominion in North America complete," he argued, and "the whole territory of that continent, east of the Mississippi, is now entirely ours."[38] Florida's value was in its natural connection to the rest of the empire. Its acquisition made British North America's boundaries natural boundaries and thus allowed them to grow and develop without constant intervention from hostile neighbors. (Here, British thinkers established an early version of the theory of "neighborhood" in North America that would continue to govern United States foreign policy well into the nineteenth century)[39]

Beautifully bound territories free of enclave and intrigue were but the first step, though. And here the Bute cabinet ran firmly into a flaw in their wonderful theory—"natural" boundaries defined *nations*, not colonies. Thus, even as they celebrated the new bounds of British America, the cabinet and the Board of Trade had to confront the dangerous implication of colonial independence brought about by their new system. America would need to be managed carefully to maintain this relationship. While the American Revolution was still years away from being conceived, much less fought, there was a growing fear among Britons that Americans might grow too far out of British

[36] Anonymous, *American Husbandry*, 59.
[37] Anonymous, *american Husbandry*, 57
[38] Anonymous, *American Husbandry*, 59.

control and seek their independence. In particular, the newly acquired Ohio Valley lands west of the Appalachian Mountains loomed as a threat. British national ideology emphasized the sea and the well-watered Atlantic coast made ocean commercial access easy. But across the mountains was another matter. Shipping goods too and from Britain to the Ohio Valley was no easy matter and there was a very real fear that allowing American settlement on the western slopes of the Appalachians would pull too many colonists too far from a productive relationship with Great Britain. Lacking necessary access to manufactures, these trans-montane settlers would be forced to develop their own manufacturing. And, lacking that source of influence, Britain would lose control of these settlers who might draw their fellow colonists into a recognition of the advantages of independence.[40] In the winter and spring of 1763, therefore, the Board of Trade began thinking how best to address this potential issue of British colonists "planting themselves in the Heart of America, out of the reach of Government… where, from the great Difficulty of procuring European Commodities, they would be compelled to commence Manufacturs [sic] to the infinite prejudice of Britain."[41]

To solve this problem, the continentalist love of system and the British precedent of divided kingdoms provided a new blueprint for the American colonies. What the Board proposed was more than a discrete set of policy proposals; in their mind they were drafting "an exact union of system" that could link the interests of empire, colonies, and Indians alike into a mutually beneficial relationship and prevent an era of discord where these three interests might compete with each other and work at cross purposes.[42] In later statements, shelburne would echo this idea that the

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[39] James E. Lewis, Jr., *The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998)
[40] P. J Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires : Britain, India, and America, c.1750-1783*, Indian Edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 163-168, 273-276.
[41] Verner Crane, ed., "Hints Relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired Countries in America," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 8 (March 1922): 367-373.
[42] Pownall, "General Propositions," 259.

Proclamation represented not just a law but an imagined "system" for America.[43] Now that the bounds of America had been fixed, a system of management would be necessary to ensure peace within bounds and the prevention of dissolution or defection. The boundary line between Indians and British colonies was the next step in this plan. By limiting settlements to the east of the Appalachians, Britain would remove a primary cause of Indian-white hostility while keeping the settlements well within reach of British ships and therefore British dependence.

The Proclamation of 1763 and its numerous bounds and differing plans of government revealed the combined love of unity and division that marked the continentalist vision of Britain. In the disposition of the newly acquired lands from France and Spain, the architects of policy demonstrated a love for both natural bounds and linked but separate spaces—a collection of established agricultural colonies with plenty of room for expansion (and investment) alongside three new military colonies designed for defense and development (and new investment) all encircling an Indian-dominated interior, linked across the Appalachians to the commercial systems of the Atlantic colonies (and therefore available for investment).

Invoking the idea that "mountains and hills are the most convenient and certain of all natural boundaries," the Board in late spring 1763 recommended the policy that would become formalized with the Proclamation of 1763 the following October.[44] This included the famous line down the Appalachian mountains and establishment of British military outposts to theoretically prevent British settlers from pushing westward into the Ohio Valley. But this common understanding of the Proclamation Line as a sort of military barrier to colonist expansion does not adequately capture the reform being undertaken in 1763 (and reflects an old idea of "natural frontier" that Enlightenment thinkers had begun abandoning in the 1700s). In much the same way

[43] See Shelburne quotes in Humphreys, "Lord Shelburne," 242.
[44] [John Pownall] "General Propositions, Form and Constitution of Government to be established in the new Colonies, [1763]" Shelburne Papers, 48: 559, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, as reprinted in R.

that Enlightenment France saw natural boundaries as a way of administering domestic politics (rather than against outside invaders) the cabinet and the Board saw in their boundary-making a plan for a linked series of distinct spaces within the British realm.

This tension between unity and division was clear from the Proclamation's opening paragraph and continued throughout the document. The Proclamation defends its existence by noting the king's desire "that all our loving subjects, as well of our Kingdoms as of our Colonies in America may avail themselves…of the great benefits and advantages which must accrue therefrom [America] to their commerce, manufactures, and navigation." The proclamation emphasized this purpose of delineation and definition within a common space when it referenced the king's intention "under the great seal of Great Britain, to erect within the countries and islands, ceded and confirmed to us by the said Treaty [of Paris, 1763] four distinct and separate governments."[45]

The document then lays out a series of natural boundaries in great length delimiting the colonies of Quebec, East Florida, and West Florida. Significantly, the document does this by reciting natural boundaries: oceans, rivers, lakes, and waterways. When it mentions human-drawn lines, it does so in reference to natural features, such as the boundary between East Florida and Georgia, which was to be marked "by a line drawn from… where the Chatahouchee [sic] and Flint rivers meet, to the source of St. Mary's river and by the course of the said river to the atlantick [sic] ocean."[46] Favoring rivers and watersheds, the Proclamation made much of the divisions between water courses, as when it defined the southern boundary of Quebec as a line that ran "along the high lands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the said river St. Lawrence from those

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A. Humphreys, "Lord Shelburne and the Proclamation of 1763." *The English Historical Review* 49, no. 194 (April 1, 1934): 258–64, at 260.

[45] Draft of Royal Proclamation contained in "Correspondence relating to the Proclamation of 1763," in Great Britain, Public Record Office. *Records of the British Colonial Office, Class 5, Part 1: Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981-1984. Microfilm, 12 reels. Part 1, Reel 3, Vol. 65, 0866-0900, at 0883.

[46] Board of Trade, "Draft of Royal Proclamation," 0885-0886.

which fall into the sea."[47] Even the most famous boundary along the Appalachians was defined by watersheds: governors would not be allowed to "pass patents for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers which fall into the atlantick ocean [sic] from the west and north west."[48]

The focus on waterways in the Proclamation reveals the idea of system that governed the plan. While the exploits of the East India Company opened the door for increasing British participation in Asian politics and economies, metropolitan thinkers had a much more modest vision for North America. After a century and a half of trials and errors, Britain had come to accept the American colonies for what they were—producers of agricultural surpluses that were most valuable as growing markets for British manufacturing. America had represented the fastest growing sector of the British economy in the 1700s, but it was not a particularly exciting place. Long gone were the visions of glittering piles of Spanish gold and silver. Instead, America was to be a land of farms and plantations producing (mostly) cereals for re-export to Continental markets. But it was a major engine of British manufacturing growth. With no manufacturing sector of their own, the American colonies relied heavily upon British-made goods in a way that no other part of the world did.[49] The Proclamation established the defining features of these divided territories—those with river access to the Atlantic were to be the farming districts, easily reachable by British commerce. Those inland areas not directly linked by water to the Atlantic would be the zone of Indian hunting and British inland trade, carried overland by any British subject who wished to risk their fortunes in the interior.

This idea of system also explains one the Proclamation's other puzzling features, one that has plagued historians of the native South for quite some time—the Proclamation's establishment of a free trade with the Indians of the interior. The policies of 1763 and 1764 introduced a new system into Indian relations—the expansion of the idea of free trade into Indian country. Historians of the

[47] Board of Trade, "Draft," 0885
[48] Board of Trade, "Draft," 0894

Southeast in particular have puzzled over this provision of the Proclamation, renewed with the Board of Trade's Plan of 1764 governing a revised Indian trading system. Abandoning the old colonial system of traders licensed to specific towns and each town limited to one trader, the new model allowed for any British subject to post a bond and trade anywhere in Indian country that they saw fit. No other policy united the fractured interests of the Indian trade like this policy—older traders, colonial governors, and royal Indian superintendents alike bemoaned the policy. And yet the Lords of Trade stuck to it. Historians have puzzled over this for quite some time but have still been left scratching their heads and chalking it up to George III's stubbornness.[50]

The policy, however, makes much sense as part of the plan being created in 1763-4. Free trade, after all, had become the defining feature of Scottish political and historical thinking by the middle decades of the 1700s. Hume advocated free and open trade as the best path to universal prosperity within a kingdom.[51] Adam Smith would emerge as the most famous advocate of free trade a little over a decade later. In the continentalist reading of the history of Union, Scots' abilities to freely move and trade throughout the British Empire, without restriction had not only brought prosperity to Scots but had led to a better commerce with America and an expanded wealth of Great Britain overall.[52] [Author's note: Since Shelburne seems to be the originator of this policy, acting against Ellis's recommendations, I am hoping to get into the Shelburne Papers in Ann Arbor to explore this matter further]

The policies of 1762-1764, of course, did not create a beautiful and smoothly functioning American empire. Each of them created its own backlash that started the colonies on the course to

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[49] Paul W. Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763* (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press: 2011), 416, 423.

[50] John Juricek offers the most recent and most thorough consideration of this issue but even he is forced to fall back on an inexplicable stubbornness on the part of the Board and King. See Juricek, *Endgame for Empire: British-Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776*, Contested Boundries, series ed. Gene Allen Smith, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015), 93, 242-245.

[51] See Hume, "Of the Jealousy of Trade," in *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*.

[52] Devine, "Spoils," 94-95; Landsman, "Provinces," 267

independence, only made worse by the fact that an unstable British government implemented and withdrew policy continually. The major consequences should be well enough known to require only a brief summary here. Far from the sort of cost-saving initiative associated with the Grenville administration, these policies represented an enormous investment of royal funds. Garrisoning the Floridas, Quebec, and the Ohio Valley, as we know, required new revenue streams and the succession of British tax initiatives that marched the colonies to Revolution. The Proclamation Line itself was an ambitious and costly initiative, requiring dozens of talks with dozens of native American tribes and confederacies. Moreover, its annulment of colonial land claims sparked a political backlash in the more speculative colonies. And the Plan of 1764 and exploitive legacies of the general license system pushed the southern colonies toward a new era of land deals with Indians that sparked a different sort of backlash that nonetheless joined the movement toward Revolution in the early 1770s.

These consequences were a result of the plan's ambitions, though, not an unintended consequence. And here it is useful to return to Florida to see the ways in which committing to this new continentalist perspective required not just imposing new regulations on the colonies but in fact required a dramatic rethinking of British imperial policy. East Florida in particular was the place where this aesthetic was given freest hand to operate. Freed of the protests and encumbrances of the older British colonies, Florida was actually designed and managed according to the dictates of the new idea of nation and the strains it placed on traditional imperial practices reveal an important transition point between the so-called "First" and "Second Empires". With the Spanish removal from East Florida, the continentalists attempted to remake the old colony into a new model. But, relying on old precedents showed the immediate strains of the system and offer clues into why Britain organized its colonies differently in later years.

Simply defining the "natural" boundaries of Canada and Florida committed Britain to an unprecedented outlay of money for royal surveys in the Americas because, of course, there is no such thing as a "natural" boundary as far as governments are concerned. What there is instead is the hard work of careful survey and precise delimitation of jurisdictional bounds. Therefore, for Florida to serve its purpose as a destination for diverted westward settlers, the coast had to be mapped. It is in this aspect of the continentalist aesthetic—that the land had to be mapped before it could be administered—that we see a departure from earlier English precedent and another major flaw in the plan. British geographic knowledge had relied for over a century on the compilation of local colonial surveys who had been paid out of land fees. Untold hours of labor had been necessary to produce the maps of the various older colonies; labor that was paid for by landowners, not the royal government. It had taken decades and decades to produce even the rough sketches of the older thirteen. Looking at Florida, with its hundreds of miles of unmapped (by Britain, at least) coastline, Grenville's cabinet decided that one person would be enough for the job.

But the Board quickly acknowledged that Florida would have to be better known. Despite the fact that the Board felt quite confident making up policy for an unknown country, they did acknowledge that survey work was necessary for Florida to be fully assimilated into the empire. While a general plan of governance may not have materially depended on an accurate knowledge of the country, "the subsequent considerations which do materially depend upon it both in respect to commerce, military establishmt: [sic] and Indian regulations" did depend on such knowledge. As a result, the board requested "that some able and skilful [sic] surveyors should be immediately appointed to visit examine and survey in the most accurate and particular manner the whole of this country… of which there are not extant any charts or accounts that can be depended upon."[53] Florida was a straggling Spanish colony, but the Board believed that proper survey could make it

productive. "It is possible," they assured the king, "and we think it probable, that upon a more exact and particular survey and investigation of this country and its coasts and harbours… discoveries will be made of harbours and ports, particularly in that great promontory or tongure of land that stretches into the ocean and along teh coast of West Florida, more advantageous for commerce and better adapted to navigation in all respects than those of St. Augustine and Pensacola."[54] Here was Britain's opinion of Spanish incompetence most starkly revealed—after two centuries of settlement and navigation, the Board believed the Spanish were simply incapable of identifying a god harbor or properly surveying their territory. Britain would do better by sending better surveyors.

Here the board revealed an important shift. After decades of reliance on promising travel narratives and the rough approximations of latitudinal theory, government had realized that trained surveyors were the only route to accurate measurement and judgment of land (even though those were two different skills, they were treated as the same). The Board admitted as much in their report, lamenting "the want of such information as may be depended upon, having very little except what we have been able to collect from the uncertain and vague accounts of writers of voyages who frequently contradict each other and in no case are entirely to be relied upon."[55] The imperial infrastructure as it existed in the 1700s had to rely on such accounts, as they were cheap and easy to produce. One self-funded voyage of travel and one interested print shop had been enough to create knowledge of the Americas. As we shall see in the next chapter, this aspect of the British colonization of Florida would come under sustained scrutiny in the coming years. In a prescient move, the Board quickly worked to establish a professional survey of East Florida. All of their plans depended on it.

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[53] Humphreys, "Lord Shelburne," 262.
[54] Humphreys, "Lord Shelburne," 263.
[55] Humphreys, "Lord Shelburne," 262.

Despite its centrality to the plan for East Florida, the mapping of the colony was treated mostly as incidental to the operation. Surveying was assumed to be simple and quick. The basic plan for British East Florida was to follow the policies of "assimilation" that guided most British colonial thinking. In keeping with the aesthetics of the Proclamation of 1763, Florida policy was directed toward the end that the colony would be transformed through husbandry and commerce and eventually take its place alongside all the other American colonies. While British thinkers in the 1760s began toying with the idea that different colonies might need different systems of governance (a political relativism that alarmed Americans and drove them to suspect Britain's commitment to natural rights), the policies actually enacted in America were consistent with the Enlightenment ideals that agriculture and commerce could "civilize" any land and bring it into eventual incorporation with European governments.[56]

The policies for Florida settlement reveal this thought process at work. In contrast to the grandiose and baroque schemes for Georgia, the plans for Florida were modest and simple: identify and settle the cultivable land as quickly as possible and then link it together into counties and place it under regular government. Along the way, land and sea routes should be identified with all due speed so that the British subjects of Florida could be linked to their fellow colonists, their fellow colonies, and Britain as quickly as possible. The prevailing idea was that the most "England-like" parts of the peninsula should be quickly incorporated and the rest could then be allowed to either remain untouched, or could later be assimilated by future waves of settlers.

And Florida offered a blank slate for the English. Unlike Canada with its residual and troublesome French population, the Spanish had wholesale abandoned the colony when offered asylum and land in Cuba. And, in keeping with the British preference to work from a blank slate, the new governor of the colony, James Grant, quickly abolished all Spanish titles to Florida lands

[56] For a sustained discussion of the idea of assimilation in Anglo-American politics in the 1760s, see P.J. Marshall,

[WHEN? GET DATE FOR THIS]. Asserting that the Spaniards had been mere transients, Grant dissolved all Spanish claims, thus "reverting" the lands of Florida to King George III to distribute how he wished.[57] Lands were to be distributed by two basic mechanisms: through headroght grants upon application to the govenror directly in St. Augustine (100 acres for the head of household and 50 acres for each additional household member) and "Privy grants" of 20,000 acres to be granted by the King's Council directly to wealthy English gentlemen, who would then be tasked with recruiting and sending settlers to occupy their absentee landlords' grants.[58] Once these settlers (white Protestants only, in order to make the lands as English as possible) were situated, they would then be divided upon into parishes and counties and, having reached a large enough population, they would be allowed to elect representatives to a new legislature. In the meantime, Grant and his Council would administer the colony with no official input from the settlers.[59]

The system as Grant and the Board designed it would link surveying and settling in a fairly organic process. Each individual grant would require surveying. Surveyors joining settlers on their journeys along the various rivers would keep their eyes open for likely land, making notes soil quality, both within the grant and in other likely spots they might have passed on the way. That knowledge would then be passed on to new settlers; new journeys would follow, and more knowledge would increase. To ensure that this process continued, Grant specified that parcels' water frontage could be no more than 1/3 the length backwards from the river or creek. This would ensure a fairly orderly settlement and prevent a few settlers from dominating the supposedly better quality lands along Florida's rivers.

But the system also placed an enormous burden on surveyors, who were expected to run boundary lines while also surveying the interior of the grant, making note of how many acres of

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Unmaking, 183-187, 203-205.

[57] Mowat, *East Florida,* 53-55; Gold, *Borderland Empires*, 52-54.

[58] Mowat, *East Florida*, 53-55.

cultivable, swampy, and stoney grounds each parcel contained. And, along the way, they were to act as scouts for the governor and help plan sites for future cities, ports, and shipyards. These responsibilities were far greater than the average colonial surveyor would have known. In an established colony such as Virginia or the Carolinas, county surveyors were only responsible for laying out the boundaries of lands and returning land surveys to the colonial governments (which was occupation enough, given the conditions under which surveyors often had to work). While surveyors were expected to make note of land quality, few ever did and no policy rested on these reports being issued. And even in Pennsylvania, where surveying was more tightly controlled than elsewhere, surveyors were only expected to accurately calculate the total acreage of a parcel and make general notes on land quality, not the specific zones of arability within each.[60]

Here one can see the basic gap in imperial policy toward Florida (and perhaps toward America more generally). The Board was used to seeing maps produced by interested gentlemen working in London offices from materials collected in Whitehall. Grand maps of the colonies, such as Henry Popple's and John Mitchell's had provided plenty of accuracy working with existing materials. Working from governor's letters and manuscript charts of survey (as well as published maps) these gentlemen cartographers had managed to put together enough information to allow for the administration of the other colonies. But these gentlemen were drawing on decades of effort by local surveyors and other colonial observers, whose work had been compiled into letters and reports before being further compiled into finished maps (of, let's be honest) dubious accuracy. Failing to create a similar apparatus in Florida that could sustain a survey revealed how little the Board understood of how much human effort it took to create and maintain the knowledge networks and

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[59] Mowat, *East Florida*, 54-55. On the requirement for white Protestant settlers, see Proclamation of James Grant, reprinted in Stork*, An Account*, 88.

[60] On the lives and careers of colonial surveyors, see Sarah Hughes, *Surveyors and Statesmen : Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia.* (Richmond, Va. : Virginia Surveyors Foundation , 1979), 115-130; also John Barry Love, "The Colonial Surveyor in Pennsylvania." Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1970, 77-79, 84-85.

infrastructure that allowed a single disinterested observer such as Mitchell to make their map. [EDNEY HERE?] It made sense on paper, but was riddled with numerous flaws, the most obvious of which was that the new Surveyor General for the Southern District would not be able to see any of the maps of the southern colonies. They were all being sent to London, not to St. Augustine.

Grant's proclamation revealed the extraordinary reliance the system placed on individual surveyors. Indeed, at least one historian has faulted this reliance on surveys for the tensions between Grant and the Surveyor General of the Southern District William De Brahm.[61] In the system as described, surveyors would be responsible for identifying and reporting back those resources most useful for building a colony. Grants were to be made with a certain pre-knowledge of the territory, so that grantees' lands could be divided into "profitable and unprofitable acres." The requirements for securing title also required an exact accounting of lands: for every 50 acres of cultivable land, three would have to be planted; for every 50 acres of uncultivable land, grantees would have to raise three head of cattle; and if grants held nothing but stone, those grantees would be required to quarry, thereby producing useful piles of rock for buildings, roads, and bridges.[62] Who was responsible for reporting on the qualities and quantities of the various lands was made clear by the provisions at the end of the proclamation. Surveyors would be responsible for identifying (and grantees responsible for ceding to the king's use), "all those parts of the land…proper for erecting fortifications, public wharfs, naval yards, or for other military purposes." They would also report on "any part of the land which shall appear, by the surveyor's report, to be well adapted to the growth of hemp or flax" and grantees would be required to plant those crops on any lands so marked by the surveyor.[63]

[61] De Vorsey, "Introduction," 39.
[62] Proclamation of James Grant, in Stork, *Account*, 84-87/
[63] Proclamation of James Grant, in Stork, *Account*, 89.

It was far too much for the small operation funded by the Board of Trade. Offering only a lump sum allotment of seven hundred pounds, the Board of Trade tasked De Brahm with the dual tasks of personally surveying the entire eastern half of the Florida peninsula (and appointing and overseeing deputies to survey the western half) and also ensuring timely surveys of the enormous privy grants being given out by the governor. The whole affair turned into a decade-long comedy of errors as De Brahm and Grant jostled for power and influence in the colony.[64] After six years of effort, with occasional funds from Parliament and the Board, De Brahm did complete the coastal survey of Florida, presenting his twenty-three foot-long map to the Board in 1772. By the time he returned to resume his surveys in 1775, Britain was well on its way to losing its American colonies (thanks to the policies of 1762-4 and their successors) and the whole idea of system in America was about to be undone.

But the continentalist approach did not die in the American Revolution. Indeed, in looking at Florida and in particular the mapping of the region, one can see the earliest glimmers of a new approach to imperial policy that would shape Britain's colonization of India. The organization (and improved funding) of systematic surveys in the subcontinent pushed Britain into new ideas and definitions of empire, as explored by Matthew Edney. And while historians such as Edney and P.J. Marshall have carefully compared Britain's approaches to empire in America and India, they have not altogether explored the direct links between one and the other. Perhaps[65] this is because the two empires look so different. But, given that the same coteries of Scots and Irish military and imperial

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[64] This story is the subject of a current book chapter I am writing on De Brahm's life and work. The outlines, however, can be found in other works. See Charles Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province, 1763-1784 (*Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California press, 1943), 52-53. Biographers of De Brahm and Grant have, perhaps unsurprisingly, tended to take the side of their own subject in this fight. For the pro-Grant view, see Paul David Nelson, *General James Grant: Scottish Soldier and Royal Governor of East Florida* (Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 1993), 64, 70-71; for a version more favorable to De Brahm, see Louis De Vorsey, Jr., "Introduction" in John Gerar William De Brahm, *De Brahm's Report of the General Survey in the Southern District of North America*, ed. and intro. Louis De Vorsey, Jr. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), 39.

[65] Edney, Matthew H. *Mapping an Empire the Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 /*. Chicago, Ill. : University of Chicago Press, 1997;

officers directed the colonization, it is worth exploring in greater detail how the continentalist approach developed in America both ended one empire in America and laid the foundation for a second one in Asia.

Marshall, P. J. *The Making and Unmaking of Empires : Britain, India, and America, c.1750-1783* /. Oxford ; Oxford University Press, 2005.